GFP
BUNNY |
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Eduardo
Kac
My transgenic artwork "GFP Bunny" comprises the creation
of a green fluorescent rabbit, the public dialogue generated by
the project, and the social integration of the rabbit. GFP stands
for green fluorescent protein. "GFP Bunny" was realized
in 2000 and first presented publicly in Avignon, France. Transgenic
art, I proposed elsewhere [1], is a new art form based on the use
of genetic engineering to transfer natural or synthetic genes to
an organism, to create unique living beings. This must be done with
great care, with acknowledgment of the complex issues thus raised
and, above all, with a commitment to respect, nurture, and love
the life thus created.
WELCOME, ALBA
I will never forget the moment when I first held her in my arms,
in Jouy-en-Josas, France, on April 29, 2000. My apprehensive anticipation
was replaced by joy and excitement. Alba -- the name given her by
my wife, my daughter, and I -- was lovable and affectionate and
an absolute delight to play with. As I cradled her, she playfully
tucked her head between my body and my left arm, finding at last
a comfortable position to rest and enjoy my gentle strokes. She
immediately awoke in me a strong and urgent sense of responsibility
for her well-being.
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Eduardo
Kac and Alba, the fluorescent bunny.
Photo:
Chrystelle Fontaine
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Alba is undoubtedly a very special animal, but I want to be clear that
her formal and genetic uniqueness are but one component of the "GFP
Bunny" artwork. The "GFP Bunny" project is a complex social
event that starts with the creation of a chimerical animal that does not
exist in nature (i.e., "chimerical" in the sense of a cultural
tradition of imaginary animals, not in the scientific connotation of an
organism in which there is a mixture of cells in the body) and that also
includes at its core: 1) ongoing dialogue between professionals
of several disciplines (art, science, philosophy, law, communications,
literature, social sciences) and the public on cultural and ethical implications
of genetic engineering; 2) contestation of the alleged supremacy
of DNA in life creation in favor of a more complex understanding of the
intertwined relationship between genetics, organism, and environment;
3) extension of the concepts of biodiversity and evolution to incorporate
precise work at the genomic level; 4) interspecies communication
between humans and a transgenic mammal; 5) integration and presentation
of "GFP Bunny" in a social and interactive context; 6)
examination of the notions of normalcy, heterogeneity, purity, hybridity,
and otherness; 7) consideration of a non-semiotic notion of communication
as the sharing of genetic material across traditional species barriers;
8) public respect and appreciation for the emotional and cognitive
life of transgenic animals; 9) expansion of the present practical
and conceptual boundaries of artmaking to incorporate life invention.
Alba, the
fluorescent bunny.
Photo:
Chrystelle Fontaine
GLOW IN THE
FAMILY
"Alba", the green fluorescent bunny, is an albino rabbit. This
means that, since she has no skin pigment, under ordinary environmental
conditions she is completely white with pink eyes. Alba is not green all
the time. She only glows when illuminated with the correct light. When
(and only when) illuminated with blue light (maximum excitation at 488
nm), she glows with a bright green light (maximum emission at 509 nm).
She was created with EGFP, an enhanced version (i.e., a synthetic mutation)
of the original wild-type green fluorescent gene found in the jellyfish
Aequorea Victoria. EGFP gives about two orders of magnitude greater fluorescence
in mammalian cells (including human cells) than the original jellyfish
gene [2].
The first phase of the "GFP Bunny" project was completed
in February 2000 with the birth of "Alba" in Jouy-en-Josas,
France. This was accomplished with the invaluable assistance of zoosystemician
Louis Bec [3] and scientists Louis-Marie Houdebine and Patrick Prunet
[4]. Alba's name was chosen by consensus between my wife Ruth, my daughter
Miriam, and myself. The second phase is the ongoing debate, which
started with the first public announcement of Alba's birth, in the context
of the Planet Work conference, in San Francisco, on May 14, 2000. The
third phase will take place when the bunny comes home to Chicago,
becoming part of my family and living with us from this point on.
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Medieval
rabbit. Detail from the tapestry "The Lady with the Unicorn",
c. 1500. Cluny Museum, Paris. |
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Aztec
rabbit. Shown on the back of the "Coronation Stone of Motecuhzoma
II", Mexico, A.D. 1503. Art Institute, Chicago. |
FROM DOMESTICATION TO SELECTIVE BREEDING
The human-rabbit association can be traced back to the biblical era, as
exemplified by passages in the books Leviticus (Lev. 11:5) and Deuteronomy
(De. 14:7), which make reference to saphan, the Hebrew word for rabbit.
Phoenicians seafarers discovered rabbits on the Iberian Peninsula around
1100 BC and, thinking that these were Hyraxes (also called Rock Dassies),
called the land "i-shepan-im" (land of the Hyraxes). Since the
Iberian Peninsula is north of Africa, relative geographic position suggests
that another Punic derivation comes from sphan, "north". As
the Romans adapted "i-shepan-im" to Latin, the word Hispania
was created -- one of the etymological origins of Spain. In his book III
the Roman geographer Strabo (ca. 64 BC - AD 21) called Spain "the
land of rabbits". Later on, the Roman emperor Servius Sulpicius Galba
(5 BC - AD 69), whose reign was short-lived (68-69 AD), issued a coin
on which Spain is represented with a rabbit at her feet. Although semi-domestication
started in the Roman period, in this initial phase rabbits were kept in
large walled pens and were allowed to breed freely.
Humans started to play a direct role in the evolution of the rabbit from
the sixth to the tenth centuries AD, when monks in southern France domesticated
and bred rabbits under more restricted conditions [5]. Originally from
the region comprised by southwestern Europe and North Africa, the European
rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) is the ancestor of all domestic breeds.
Since the sixth century, because of its sociable nature the rabbit increasingly
has become integrated into human families as a domestic companion. Such
human-induced selective breeding created the morphological diversity found
in rabbits today. The first records describing a variety of fur colors
and sizes distinct from wild breeds date from the sixteenth century. It
was not until the eighteenth century that selective breeding resulted
in the Angora rabbit, which has a uniquely thick and beautiful wool coat.
The process of domestication carried out since the sixth century, coupled
with ever increasing worldwide migration and trade, resulted in many new
breeds and in the introduction of rabbits into new environments different
from their place of origin. While there are well over 100 known breeds
of rabbit around the world, "recognized" pedigree breeds vary
from one country to another. For example, the American Rabbit Breeders
Association (ARBA) "recognizes" 45 breeds in the U.S.A., with
more under development.
In addition to selective breeding, naturally occurring genetic variations
also contributed to morphological diversity. The albino rabbit, for example,
is a natural (recessive) mutation which in the wild has minimal chances
of survival (due to lack of proper pigmentation for camouflage and keener
vision to spot prey). However, because it has been bred by humans, it
can be found widely today in healthy populations. The human preservation
of albino animals is also connected to ancient cultural traditions: almost
every Native American tribe believed that albino animals had particular
spiritual significance and had strict rules to protect them [6].
FROM BREEDING TO TRANSGENIC ART
"GFP Bunny" is a transgenic artwork and not a breeding project.
The differences between the two include the principles that guide
the work, the procedures employed, and the main objectives. Traditionally,
animal breeding has been a multi-generational selection process that has
sought to create pure breeds with standard form and structure, often to
serve a specific performative function. As it moved from rural milieus
to urban environments, breeding de-emphasized selection for behavioral
attributes but continued to be driven by a notion of aesthetics anchored
on visual traits and on morphological principles. Transgenic art, by
contrast, offers a concept of aesthetics that emphasizes the social rather
than the formal aspects of life and biodiversity, that challenges notions
of genetic purity, that incorporates precise work at the genomic level,
and that reveals the fluidity of the concept of species in an ever increasingly
transgenic social context.
As a transgenic artist, I am not interested in the creation of genetic
objects, but on the invention of transgenic social subjects. In other
words, what is important is the completely integrated process of creating
the bunny, bringing her to society at large, and providing her with a
loving, caring, and nurturing environment in which she can grow safe and
healthy. This integrated process is important because it places genetic
engineering in a social context in which the relationship between the
private and the public spheres are negotiated. In other words, biotechnology,
the private realm of family life, and the social domain of public opinion
are discussed in relation to one another. Transgenic art is not about
the crafting of genetic objets d'art, either inert or imbued with vitality.
Such an approach would suggest a conflation of the operational sphere
of life sciences with a traditional aesthetics that privileges formal
concerns, material stability, and hermeneutical isolation. Integrating
the lessons of dialogical philosophy [7] and cognitive ethology [8], transgenic
art must promote awareness of and respect for the spiritual (mental) life
of the transgenic animal. The word "aesthetics" in the context
of transgenic art must be understood to mean that creation, socialization,
and domestic integration are a single process. The question is not
to make the bunny meet specific requirements or whims, but to enjoy her
company as an individual (all bunnies are different), appreciated for
her own intrinsic virtues, in dialogical interaction.
One very important aspect of "GFP Bunny" is that Alba, like
any other rabbit, is sociable and in need of interaction through communication
signals, voice, and physical contact. As I see it, there is no reason
to believe that the interactive art of the future will look and feel like
anything we knew in the twentieth century. "GFP Bunny" shows
an alternative path and makes clear that a profound concept of interaction
is anchored on the notion of personal responsibility (as both care
and possibility of response). "GFP Bunny" gives continuation
to my focus on the creation, in art, of what Martin Buber called dialogical
relationship [9], what Mikhail Bakhtin called dialogic sphere of existence
[10], what Emile Benveniste called intersubjectivity [11], and what Humberto
Maturana calls consensual domains [12]: shared spheres of perception,
cognition, and agency in which two or more sentient beings (human or otherwise)
can negotiate their experience dialogically. The work is also informed
by Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy of alterity [13], which states that our
proximity to the other demands a response, and that the interpersonal
contact with others is the unique relation of ethical responsibility.
I create my works to accept and incorporate the reactions and decisions
made by the participants, be they eukaryotes or prokaryotes [14]. This
is what I call the human-plant-bird-mammal-robot-insect-bacteria interface.
In order to be practicable, this aesthetic platform--which reconciles
forms of social intervention with semantic openness and systemic complexity--must
acknowledge that every situation, in art as in life, has its own specific
parameters and limitations. So the question is not how to eliminate
circumscription altogether (an impossibility), but how to keep it indeterminate
enough so that what human and nonhuman participants think, perceive, and
do when they experience the work matters in a significant way. My
answer is to make a concerted effort to remain truly open to the participant's
choices and behaviors, to give up a substantial portion of control over
the experience of the work, to accept the experience as-it-happens as
a transformative field of possibilities, to learn from it, to grow with
it, to be transformed along the way. Alba is a participant in the "GFP
Bunny" transgenic artwork; so is anyone who comes in contact with
her, and anyone who gives any consideration to the project. A complex
set of relationships between family life, social difference, scientific
procedure, interspecies communication, public discussion, ethics, media
interpretation, and art context is at work.
Throughout the twentieth century art progressively moved away from pictorial
representation, object crafting, and visual contemplation. Artists searching
for new directions that could more directly respond to social transformations
gave emphasis to process, concept, action, interaction, new media, environments,
and critical discourse. Transgenic art acknowledges these changes and
at the same time offers a radical departure from them, placing the
question of actual creation of life at the center of the debate. Undoubtedly,
transgenic art also develops in a larger context of profound shifts in
other fields. Throughout the twentieth century physics acknowledged uncertainty
and relativity, anthropology shattered ethnocentricity, philosophy denounced
truth, literary criticism broke away from hermeneutics, astronomy discovered
new planets, biology found "extremophile" microbes living in
conditions previously believed not capable of supporting life, molecular
biology made cloning a reality.
Transgenic art acknowledges the human role in rabbit evolution as a natural
element, as a chapter in the natural history of both humans and rabbits,
for domestication is always a bidirectional experience. As humans domesticate
rabbits, so do rabbits domesticate their humans. If teleonomy is the apparent
purpose in the organization of living systems [15], then transgenic art
suggests a non-utilitarian and more subtle approach to the debate. Moving
beyond the metaphor of the artwork as a living organism into a complex
embodiment of the trope, transgenic art opens a nonteleonomic domain for
the life sciences. In other words, in the context of transgenic art humans
exert influence in the organization of living systems, but this influence
does not have a pragmatic purpose. Transgenic art does not attempt to
moderate, undermine, or arbitrate the public discussion. It seeks to offer
a new perspective that offers ambiguity and subtlety where we usually
only find affirmative ("in favor") and negative ("against")
polarity. "GFP Bunny" highlights the fact that transgenic animals
are regular creatures that are as much part of social life as any other
life form, and thus are deserving of as much love and care as any other
animal [16].
In developing the "GFP Bunny" project I have paid close attention
and given careful consideration to any potential harm that might be caused.
I decided to proceed with the project because it became clear that it
was safe [17]. There were no surprises throughout the process: the genetic
sequence responsible for the production of the green fluorescent protein
was integrated into the genome through zygote microinjection [18]. The
pregnancy was carried to term successfully. "GFP Bunny" does
not propose any new form of genetic experimentation, which is the same
as saying: the technologies of microinjection and green fluorescent protein
are established well-known tools in the field of molecular biology. Green
fluorescent protein has already been successfully expressed in many host
organisms, including mammals [19]. There are no mutagenic effects resulting
from transgene integration into the host genome. Put another way: green
fluorescent protein is harmless to the rabbit. It is also important to
point out that the "GFP Bunny" project breaks no social rule:
humans have determined the evolution of rabbits for at least 1400 years.
ALTERNATIVES TO ALTERITY
As we negotiate our relationship with our lagomorph companion [20], it
is necessary to think rabbit agency without anthropomorphizing it. Relationships
are not tangible, but they form a fertile field of investigation in art,
pushing interactivity into a literal domain of intersubjectivity. Everything
exists in relationship to everything else. Nothing exists in isolation.
By focusing my work on the interconnection between biological, technological,
and hybrid entities I draw attention to this simple but fundamental fact.
To speak of interconnection or intersubjectivity is to acknowledge the
social dimension of consciousness. Therefore, the concept of intersubjectivity
must take into account the complexity of animal minds. In this context,
and particularly in regard to "GFP Bunny", one must be open
to understanding the rabbit mind, and more specifically to Alba's unique
spirit as an individual. It is a common misconception that a rabbit is
less intelligent than, for example, a dog, because, among other peculiarities,
it seems difficult for a bunny to find food right in front of her face.
The cause of this ordinary phenomenon becomes clear when we consider that
the rabbit's visual system has eyes placed high and to the sides of the
skull, allowing the rabbit to see nearly 360 degrees. As a result, the
rabbit has a small blind spot of about l0 degrees directly in front of
her nose and below her chin [21]. Although rabbits do not see images as
sharply as we do, they are able to recognize individual humans through
a combination of voice, body movements, and scent as cues, provided that
humans interact with their rabbits regularly and don't change their overall
configuration in dramatic ways (such as wearing a costume that alters
the human form or using a strong perfume). Understanding how the rabbit
sees the world is certainly not enough to appreciate its consciousness
but it allows us to gain insights about its behavior, which leads us to
adapt our own to make life more comfortable and pleasant for everyone.
Alba is a healthy and gentle mammal. Contrary to popular notions of the
alleged monstrosity of genetically engineered organisms, her body shape
and coloration are exactly of the same kind we ordinarily find in albino
rabbits. Unaware that Alba is a glowing bunny, it is impossible for
anyone to notice anything unusual about her. Therefore Alba undermines
any ascription of alterity. It is precisely this productive ambiguity
that sets her apart: being at once same and different. As is the case
in most cultures, our relationship with animals is profoundly revealing
of ourselves. Our daily coexistence and interaction with members of other
species remind us of our uniqueness as humans. At the same time, it allow
us to tap into dimensions of the human spirit that are often suppressed
in daily life--such as communication without language--that reveal how
close we really are to nonhumans. The more animals become part of our
domestic life, the further we move breeding away from functionality and
animal labor. Our relationship with other animals shifts as historical
conditions are transformed by political pressures, scientific discoveries,
technological development, economic opportunities, artistic invention,
and philosophical insights. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
as we transform our understanding of human physical boundaries by introducing
new genes into developed human organisms, our communion with animals in
our environment also changes. Molecular biology has demonstrated that
the human genome is not particularly important, special, or different.
The human genome is made of the same basic elements as other known life
forms and can be seen as part of a larger genomic spectrum rich in variation
and diversity.
Western philosophers, from Aristotle [22] to Descartes [23], from Locke
[24] to Leibniz [25], from Kant [26] to Nietsche [27] and Buber [28],
have approached the enigma of animality in a multitude of ways, evolving
in time and elucidating along the way their views of humanity. While Descartes
and Kant possessed a more condescending view of the spiritual life of
animals (which can also be said of Aristotle), Locke, Leibniz, Nietsche,
and Buber are -- in different degrees -- more tolerant towards our eukaryotic
others [29]. Today, our ability to generate life through the direct method
of genetic engineering prompts a re-evaluation of the cultural objectification
and the personal subjectification of animals, and in so doing it renews
our investigation of the limits and potentialities of what we call humanity.
I do not believe that genetic engineering eliminates the mystery of what
life is; to the contrary, it reawakens in us a sense of wonder towards
the living. We will only think that biotechnology eliminates the mystery
of life if we privilege it in detriment to other views of life (as opposed
to seeing biotechnology as one among other contributions to the larger
debate) and if we accept the reductionist view (not shared by many biologists)
that life is purely and simply a matter of genetics. Transgenic art is
a firm rejection of this view and a reminder that communication and interaction
between sentient and nonsentient actants lies at the core of what we call
life. Rather than accepting the move from the complexity of life processes
to genetics, transgenic art gives emphasis to the social existence of
organisms, and thus highlights the evolutionary continuum of physiological
and behavioral characteristics between the species. The mystery and beauty
of life is as great as ever when we realize our close biological kinship
with other species and when we understand that from a limited set of genetic
bases life has evolved on Earth with organisms as diverse as bacteria,
plants, insects, fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals.
TRANSGENESIS, ART, AND SOCIETY
The success of human genetic therapy suggests the benefits of altering
the human genome to heal or to improve the living conditions of fellow
humans [30]. In this sense, the introduction of foreign genetic material
in the human genome can be seen not only as welcome but as desirable.
Developments in molecular biology, such as the above example, are at times
used to raise the specter of eugenics and biological warfare, and with
it the fear of banalization and abuse of genetic engineering. This fear
is legitimate, historically grounded, and must be addressed. Contributing
to the problem, companies often employ empty rhetorical strategies to
persuade the public, thus failing to engage in a serious debate that acknowledges
both the problems and benefits of the technology. [31] There are indeed
serious threats, such as the possible loss of privacy regarding one's
own genetic information, and unacceptable practices already underway,
such as biopiracy (the appropriation and patenting of genetic material
from its owners without explicit permission).
As we consider these problems, we can not ignore the fact that a complete
ban on all forms of genetic research would prevent the development of
much needed cures for the many devastating diseases that now ravage human
and nonhumankind. The problem is even more complex. Should such therapies
be developed successfully, what sectors of society will have access to
them? Clearly, the question of genetics is not purely and simply a scientific
matter, but one that is directly connected to political and economic directives.
Precisely for this reason, the fear raised by both real and potential
abuse of this technology must be channeled productively by society. Rather
than embracing a blind rejection of the technology, which is undoubtedly
already a part of the new bioscape, citizens of open societies must make
an effort to study the multiple views on the subject, learn about the
historical background surrounding the issues, understand the vocabulary
and the main research efforts underway, develop alternative views based
on their own ideas, debate the issue, and arrive at their own conclusions
in an effort to generate mutual understanding. Inasmuch as this seems
a daunting task, drastic consequences may result from hype, sheer opposition,
or indifference.
This is where art can also be of great social value. Since the domain
of art is symbolic even when intervening directly in a given context [32],
art can contribute to reveal the cultural implications of the revolution
underway and offer different ways of thinking about and with biotechnology.
Transgenic art is a mode of genetic inscription that is at once inside
and outside of the operational realm of molecular biology, negotiating
the terrain between science and culture. Transgenic art can help science
to recognize the role of relational and communicational issues in the
development of organisms. It can help culture by unmasking the popular
belief that DNA is the "master molecule" through an emphasis
on the whole organism and the environment (the context). At last, transgenic
art can contribute to the field of aesthetics by opening up the new symbolic
and pragmatic dimension of art as the literal creation of and responsibility
for life.
NOTES
1 - Kac, Eduardo. "Transgenic Art", Leonardo Electronic Almanac,
Vol. 6, N. 11, December 1998. Republished in: Gerfried Stocker and Christine
Schopf (eds.), Ars Electronica '99 - Life Science (Vienna, New York: Springer,
1999), pp. 289- 296. See also: Kac, Eduardo. "Genesis", in Spike/Genesis,
exhibition catalogue, O. K. Center for Contemporary Art, Linz, Austria,
pp. 50-55.
2 - After green fluorescent protein (GFP) was first isolated from Aequorea
victoria and used as a new reporter system (see: Chalfie, M., Tu, Y.,
Euskirchen, G., Ward, W., Prasher, D. (1994). Green Fluorescent Protein
as a Marker for Gene Expression. Science 263, 802-805) it was modified
in the laboratory to increase fluorescence. See: Heim, R., Cubitt, A.
B. and Tsien, R.Y. (1995) Improved green fluorescence. Nature 373:663-664;
and Heim, R., Tsien, R. Y. (1996). Engineering green fluorescent protein
for improved brightness, longer wavelengths and fluorescence resonance
energy transfer. Current Biology 6, 178-182. Further work altered the
green fluorescent protein gene to conform to the favored codons of highly
expressed human proteins and thus allowed improved expression in mammalian
cells. See: Haas, J, Park, EC and Seed, B. (1996). Codon usage limitation
in the expression of HIV-1 envelope glycoprotein. Current Biology 6: 315-24.
More recently, new mutations with greater fluorescence have been developed.
See: Yang, Te-Tuan et al. (1998). Improved fluorescence and dual color
detection with enhanced blue and green variants of the green fluorescent
protein. The Journal of biological chemistry, V. 273, N. 14, p. 8212.
For a comprehensive overview of green fluorescent protein as a genetic
marker, see: Chalfie, Martin. Kain, Steven. Green fluorescent protein
: properties, applications, and protocols (New York : Wiley-Liss, 1998).
Since its first introduction in molecular biology, GFP has been expressed
in many organisms, including bacteria, yeast, slime mold, many plants,
fruit flies, zebrafish, many mammalian cells, and even viruses. Moreover,
many organelles, including the nucleus, mitochondria, plasma membrane,
and cytoskeleton, have been marked with GFP.
3 - Artist, curator, and cultural promoter Louis Bec coined the term zoosystémicien
(zoosystemician) to define his artistic practice and his sphere of interest,
i.e., the digital modeling of living systems. Formerly Inspecteur à
la création artistique chargé des Nouvelles Technologies,
Ministère de la Culture (Coordinator of Art and Technology for
the French Ministry of Culture), Louis Bec was the Director of the festival
Avignon Numerique (Digital Avignon), celebrated in Avignon, France, from
April 1999 to November 2000, on the occasion of Avignon's status as European
cultural capital of the year 2000.
4 - Louis-Marie Houdebine and Patrick Prunet are scientists who work at
the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-INRA (National Institute
of Agronomic Research), France. Louis-Marie Houdebine is the Director
of Research of the Biology of Development and Biotechnology Unit, INRA,
Jouy-en-Josas Center, France. Among his books in French we find: Le génie
génétique, de l'animal à l'homme : un exposé
pour comprendre, un essai pour réfléchir (Paris : Flammarion,
1996); Les biotechnologies animales : une nécessité ou une
révolution inutile (Paris : Cachan : France agricole, 1998); and
Les animaux transgéniques (Paris : Cachan : Tec et Doc, 1998).
In English: Transgenic Animals - Generation and Use (Amsterdam: Harwood
Academic Publishers, 1997). Patrick Prunet is a researcher in the Group
in Physiology of Stress and Adaptation, INRA, Campus de Beaulieu, Rennes,
France.
5 - For an account of the history of domestication, see: Zeuner, Frederick
Everard. A History of Domesticated Animals (New York : Harper & Row,
1963); Clutton-Brock, Juliet. Domesticated Animals from Early Times (London:
British Museum, 1981); Caras, Roger A. A Perfect Harmony: The Intertwining
Lives of Animals and Humans Throughout History (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1996); Gautier, Achilles. La domestication. Et l'homme créa ses
animaux.(Paris: Editions Errance, 1990); Helmer, Daniel. La domestication
des animaux par les hommes préhistoriques (Paris: Masson, 1992).;
and Sawer, Carl O. Agricultural Origins and Dispersals: The Domestication
of Animals and Foodstuffs (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970). For specific
references on the domestication of rabbits see: Biadi, F. and Le Gall,
A., Le lapin de garenne (Paris: Hatier, 1993); Bianciotto, G., Bestiaires
du Moyen Âge (Paris: Stock, 1980); Brochier, J. J., Anthologie du
lapin (Paris: Hatier, 1987); Le lapin, aspects historiques, culturels
et sociaux.Ñ Ethnozootechnie, n° 27, 1980.
6 - Detailed information about the spiritual values of individual tribes
can be found in: Gill, Sam D., Dictionary of Native American mythology
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1994). See also: Hirschfelder, Arlene
B., Encyclopedia of Native American religions : an introduction (New York
: Facts on File, 2000). Richard Erdoes and Alfonso Ortiz (Editors). American
Indian Myths and Legends (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985). A recent case
that well illustrates the sacred qualities of albino animals for Native
American tribes was the birth of "Miracle", the white buffalo
calf. "Miracle" was born on the Heider farm, in Janesville,
Wisconsin, on August 20, 1994. The announcement of Miracle's birth
prompted the American Bison Association to say that the last documented
white buffalo died in 1959. Miracle is held sacred by buffalo-hunting
Plains Indians, including the Lakota, the Oneida, the Cherokee, and the
Cheyenne. Soon after her birth, Joseph Chasing Horse, traditional leader
of the Lakota nation, visited the site of Miracle's birth and conducted
a Pipe ceremony there, while telling the story of White Buffalo Calf Woman,
a legendary figure who brought the first Pipe to the Lakota people. Following
suit, more than 20,000 people come to see Miracle, and the gate to the
Heider's pasture and the trees next to it soon became covered with offerings:
feathers, necklaces and pieces of colorful cloth. News of the calf spread
quickly through the Native American community because its birth fulfilled
a 2,000-year-old prophecy of northern Plains Indians. Joseph Chasing Horse
explained in a newspaper interview that 2,000 years ago a young woman
who first appeared in the shape of a white buffalo gave the Lakota's ancestors
a sacred pipe and sacred ceremonies and made them guardians of the Black
Hills. Before leaving, she also prophesied that one day she would return
to purify the world, bringing back spiritual balance and harmony; the
birth of a white buffalo calf would be a sign that her return was at hand.
Owen Mike, head of the Ho-Chunk (Winnebago) buffalo clan, said in the
same article that his people have a slightly different interpretation
of the white calf's significance. He added, however, that the Ho-Chunk
version of the prophecy also stresses the return of harmony, both in nature
and among all peoples. "It's more of a blessing from the Great Spirit,"
Mike explained. "It's a sign. This white buffalo is showing us that
everything is going to be okay." See: "Miracle", Tom Laskin,
Isthmus Newspaper, Madison, Wisconsin; Nov. 25-Dec 1, 1994.
7 - In the twentieth century, dialogical philosophy found renewed impetus
with Martin Buber, who published in 1923 the book I-Thou, in which he
stated that humankind is capable of two kinds of relationship: I and Thou
(reciprocity) and I-It (objectification). In I and Thou relations one
fully engages in the encounter with the other and carries on a real dialogue.
In I-It relations "It" becomes an object of control. The "I"
in both cases is not the same, for in the first case there is a non-hierarchical
meeting while in the second case there is detachment. See: Buber, Martin.
I and Thou (New York: Collier, 1987). Martin Buber's dialogical philosophy
of relation, which is very close to Phenomenology and Existentialism,
also influenced Mikhail Bakhtin's philosophy of language. Bakhtin stated
in countless writings that ordinary instances of monological experience--in
culture, politics, and society--suppress the dialogical reality of existence.
8 - Cognitive ethology can be defined as "the evolutionary and comparative
study of nonhuman animal thought processes, consciousness, beliefs, or
rationality, and is an area in which research is informed by different
types of investigations and explanations." See: Bekoff, Marc (1995).
"Cognitive Ethology and the Explanation of Nonhuman Animal Behavior",
in Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science. J. A. Meyer and H. L.
Roitblat, eds. (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995), 119-150. A pioneer
of ethology, the Estonian zoologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944)
devoted himself to the problem of how living beings subjectively perceive
their environment and how this perception determines their behavior. In
1909 he wrote "Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere", introducing
the German word 'umwelt" (roughly translated, "environment")
to refer to the subjective world of an organism. The book has been excerpted
in Foundations of Comparative Ethology, ed. G. Burghardt (New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1985). Since Uexküll emphasized the fact that
signs and meanings are of the utmost importance in all aspects of biological
processes (at the level of the cell or the organism), he also anticipated
the concerns of cognitive ethology and biosemiotics (the study of signs,
of communication, and of information in living organisms). See: Uexkull,
Jacob von. Mondes animaux et monde humain : suivi de théorie de
la signification (Paris : Denoël, 1984). Further contributing to
the subjective world of other animals, Donald Griffin first demonstrated
that bats navigate the world using biosonar, a process he called "echolocation".
See: Griffin, Donald R. Listening in the dark : the acoustic orientation
of bats and men (Ithaca ; London : Comstock Publishing, 1986). First published
in 1958. Griffin has since contributed to cognitive ethology with many
books, most notably: The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity
of Mental Experience. (New York : The Rockefeller University Press, 1976),
Animal Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) and Animal
Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Another important
pioneering contribution was: Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat?
Philosophical Review 83: 435-405. In this paper Nagel offered a critique
of physicalist explanations of the mind, pointing out that they do not
take into account consciousness, i.e. what is the actual life experience
of an organism. In this paper, a classic both of cognitive ethology and
consciousness studies, Nagel reminds us that what science professes to
be objective accounts inevitably omit points of view. In recognition of
Griffin's pioneering work, which exhibited the problems of behaviorist
and cognitive thinking that fails to acknowledge conscious awareness in
mammals and thinking in small animals, several researchers pushed forward
the research agenda of cognitive ethology. See: Ristau, Carolyn A. (ed.)
Cognitive ethology : the minds of other animals : essays in honor of Donald
R. Griffin (Hillsdale, N.J. : L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991). A comprehensive
discussion of the multiple views that inform the debate around cognitive
ethology, including the critique of those who oppose the very foundational
principles of this science, can be found in: Bekoff, M., and Allen, C.
"Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents", in
R. W. Mitchell, N. Thompson, and L. Miles, eds. Anthropomorphism, Anecdote,
and Animals: The Emperor's New Clothes? (Lincoln, Nebraska: University
of Nebraska Press, 1993). In his book Kinds of Minds, Daniel Clement Dennett
makes a general attempt to explain consciousness irrespective of species.
He takes the "intentional stance", i.e., the strategy of interpreting
the behavior of something (a living or non living thing) as if it were
a rational agent whose actions are determined by its beliefs and desires.
He examines the "intentionality" of a molecule that replicates
itself, that of a dog that mark territory, and that of a human that wishes
to do something in particular. In the end, for Dennett it is our ability
to use language that forms the particular mind humans have. Dennett believes
that language is a way to unravel the representations in our mind and
extract units of them. Without language, an animal may have exactly the
same representation, but it doesn't have access to any unit of it. See:
Dennett, D. C. Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness.
(New York: Basic Books, 1996). For an examination of the rapport between
philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition,
see: Allen, C., & M. Bekoff. Species of Mind, The philosophy and biology
of cognitive ethology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Focused studies
on the intelligence of non-primate species have also contributed to demonstrate
the unique mental abilities of creatures such as marine mammals, birds,
and ants. See: Schusterman, R. J., Thomas, J. A., and Wood, F. G. eds.
Dolphin Cognition and Behavior: A comparative Approach (Hillsdale, New
Jersey: Erlbaum, 1986); Skutch, A. F. The Minds of Birds (College Station,
TX: Texas A. & M. University Press, 1996); Pepperberg, Irene Maxine.
The Alex studies : cognitive and communicative abilities of grey parrots
(Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Harvard University Press, 2000). For the
question of communication in ants see Gordon, D. M. 1992. Wittgenstein
and ant-watching. Biology and Philosophy 7: 13-25. On page 23, Deborah
Gordon points out that "the way that scientists see animals' behavior
occurs... [in] a system embedded in the social practices of a certain
time and place." Gordon's field studies of interactions between neighboring
colonies have shown that ants learn to recognize not only their own nest-mates
but also ants from neighboring, unrelated colonies. Her field studies
have led to further research concerning communication networks within
ant colonies. For a more exhaustive examination of the problem, see: Gordon,
D. M. . Ants at Work: how an insect society is organized. New York: Free
Press, 1999). The key contribution of Gordon's book is to undue the popular
perception that ant colonies run according to rigid rules and to show
(based on her fieldwork with harvester ants in Arizona) that an ant society
can be sophisticated and change its collective behavior as circumstances
require. Finding inspiration in Charles Darwin's book The Expression of
Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1872),
Jeffrey M. Masson and Susan McCarthy make a convincing case for animal
emotion. See: Masson, J. M. and S McCarthy. When Elephants Weep:
The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1995).
On the minds of nonhuman primates, see: Cheney, D. L., and Seyfarth, R.
M. How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990); Montgomery, S. 1991. Walking With
the Great Apes: Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey, and Birutè Galdikas.
New York: SUNY Press; Savage-Rumbaugh, , S. and R. Lewin 1994. Kanzi,
The ape at the brink of the human mind. New York: Wiley; Russon, A. E.,
K. A. Bard & s. T. Parker eds. 1996. Reaching into Thought,
the Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge U. Press; Waal, F. M. de
1997 Bonobos: The Forgotten Ape. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
9 - Buber, Martin. I and Thou (New York: Collier, 1987), p. 124. According
to Michael Theunissen, "Buber sought to outline an "ontology
of the between" in which individual consciousness can only be understood
within the context of our relationships with others, not independent of
them." See: Theunissen, Michael. The Other: Studies in the Social
Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sarte, and Buber. Trans. Christopher Macann.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 271-272.
10 - Bakhtin, M. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Trans. Caryl Emerson.
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984), p. 270. For Bakhtin, dialogic relationships
"are an almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech
and all relationships and manifestations of human life -- in general,
everything that has meaning and significance." Op.cit., p. 40.
11 - On the formation of "ego" or subjectivity through language,
and the notion that it is only through language that we are conscious
(i.e., are "subject" at all), see: Emile Benveniste, "Subjectivity
in Language," chap. 21 in Problems in General Linguistics, trans.
Mary Elizabeth Meek (1966; Coral Gables, Florida: Univ. of Miami Press,
1971), pp. 223-230. Echoing Buber, Benveniste's position is that when
a person says "I" (i.e., when an individual occupies a subject
position in discourse), he or she takes one's place as a member of the
intersubjective community of persons. Thus, in being a subject/person,
he or she is not simply an object/thing.
Benveniste was certainly not the only to consider the intersubjective
nature of human experience. Wlad Godzich wrote: "For Kant, the fact
that the individual could not experience the object as it was in itself
required the postulation of another dimension among individuals: intersubjectivity".
See: Arac, Jonathan and Godzich, Wlad (eds.) The Yale Critics: Deconstruction
in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 46.
When Edmund Husserl considered in retrospect his lectures of 1910/11,
he wrote: "My lectures at Göttingen in 1910-11 already presented
a first sketch of my transcendental theory of empathy, i.e. the reduction
of human existence as mundane being-with-one-another to transcendental
intersubjectivity." See: Husserl, E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology
and a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, Phenomenological Investigations
Concerning Constitution (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), pg. 417. For Maurice
Marleau-Ponty our not-sameness to each other is not a flaw, but is the
very condition of communication: "the body of the other -- as bearer
of symbolic behaviors and of the behavior of true reality -- tears itself
away from being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of a true communication,
and confers on my objects the new dimension of intersubjective being."
For Marleau-Ponty it is in the ambiguity of intersubjectivity that our
perception "wakes up." See: Merleau-Ponty, M. Primacy of Perception
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 17-18. For a critical
analysis of Merleau-Ponty's position on intersubjectivity, see: Friedman,
Robert M "Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Intersubjectivity", Philosophy
Today 19: 228-42 (Fall 1975). Jurgen Habermas also gave the concept of
intersubjectivity a central place in his work. Giving continuation to
one of the projects of the Frankfurt School (the critique of the notion
that valid human knowledge is restricted to empirically testable propositions
arrived at by means of systematic inquiry professed to be objective and
devoid of particular interests), Habermas finds in intersubjectivity a
means of opposing theories which base truth and meaning on individual
consciousness. For him, intersubjectivity is a communication situation
in which "the speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, bring
about the interpersonal relationships that will allow them to achieve
mutual understanding". See: Habermas, J. (1976). Some distinctions
in universal pragmatics. Theory and Society, 3, (2), p. 157. Habermas
further explained his view of intersubjective communication: "When
a hearer accepts a speech act, an agreement comes about between at least
two acting and speaking subjects. However this does not rest only on the
intersubjective recognition of a single, thematically stressed validity
claim. Rather, an agreement of this sort is achieved simultaneously at
three levels.... It belongs to the communicative intent of the speaker
(a) that he perform a speech act that is right in respect to the given
normative context, so that between him and the hearer an intersubjective
relation will come about which is recognized as legitimate; (b) that he
make a true statement (or correct existential presuppositions), so that
the hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the speaker; and (c)
that he express truthfully his beliefs, intentions, feelings, desires,
and the like, so that the hearer will give credence to what is said."
See: Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984),
pp. 307-308.
12 - From the perspective of his unique and systematic branch of theoretical
biology, Maturana explains the notion of consensual domain with great
clarity: "When two or more organisms interact recursively as structurally
plastic systems, each becoming a medium for the realization of the autopoiesis
of the other, the result is mutual ontogenic structural coupling. From
the point of view of the observer, it is apparent that the operational
effectiveness that the various modes of conduct of the structurally coupled
organisms have for the realization of their autopoiesis under their reciprocal
interactions is established during the history of their interactions and
through their interactions. Furthermore, for an observer, the domain of
interactions specified through such ontogenic structural coupling appears
as a network of sequences of mutually triggering interlocked conducts
that is indistinguishable from what he or she would call a consensual
domain. In fact, the various conducts or behaviors involved are both arbitrary
and contextual. The behaviors are arbitrary because they can have any
form as long as they operate as triggering perturbations in the interactions;
they are contextual because their participation in the interlocked interactions
of the domain is defined only with respect to the interactions that constitute
the domain. Accordingly, I shall call the domain of interlocked conducts
that results from ontogenic reciprocal structural coupling between structurally
plastic organisms a consensual domain." See: Maturana, Humberto R.
"Biology of Language: The Epistemology of Reality", in G. Miller
& E. Lenneberg (Eds.) Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought
(New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 47. For an earlier discussion of
"consensual domains", see: Maturana, H. R. The organization
of the living: a theory of the living organization. The International
journal of Man-Machine Studies, 1975, 7, 313-332.
Still in "Biology of Language: The Epistemology of Reality",
Maturana explains the term autopoiesis: "There is a class of dynamic
systems that are realized, as unities, as networks of productions (and
disintegrations) of components that: (a) recursively participate through
their interactions in the realization of the network of productions (and
disintegrations) of components that produce them; and (b) by realizing
its boundaries, constitute this network of productions (and disintegrations)
of components as a unity in the space they specify and in which they exist.
Francisco Varela and I called such systems autopoietic systems, and autopoietic
organization their organization. An autopoietic system that exists in
physical space is a living system (or, more correctly, the physical space
is the space that the components of living systems specify and in which
they exist)". Op. cit., p. 36. See also: Maturana, H.R. & Varela,
F.G. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. (Dordrecht,
Holland: Boston: London : Reidel, 1980). This book was originally published
in Chile as: De Maquinas y Seres Vivos, Editorial Universitaria, 1972.
13 - Emmanuel Levinas wrote: "Proximity, difference which is non-indifference,
is responsibility." See Levinas, E. Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1981), p. 139. Partially influenced by the dialogical philosophy of Martin
Buber, Levinas sought to go beyond the ethically neutral tradition of
ontology through an analysis of the 'face-to-face' relation with the Other.
For Levinas, the Other can not be known as such. Instead, the Other arises
in relation to others, in a relationship of ethical responsibility. For
Levinas, this ethical responsibility must be regarded as prior to ontology.
For his insights on Buber's work, see: Levinas, E. "Martin Buber
and the Theory of Knowledge", in Schilpp, P. (ed.) The philosophy
of Martin Buber (La Salle, IL: Open Court , 1967), pp. 133-150.
14 - There are three types of cell: Prokaryotes, Eukaryotes, and Archae.
Prokaryotes are unicellular organisms (e.g., bacteria) that lack a nuclear
membrane and membrane-bound organelles. Eukaryotes are unicellular (e.g.,
yeast) or multicellular organisms (e.g., humans) that have a nuclear membrane
surrounding genetic material and numerous membrane-bound organelles dispersed
in a complex cellular structure. All cells in multicellular organisms
are eukaryotic. Eukaryotes include most organisms (algae, fungi, protozoa,
plants, and animals) except viruses, bacteria, and blue-green algae. Another
major domain of life is called Archaea, microorganisms with genetic features
distinct from prokarya and eukarya. The DNA of Archea is not contained
within a nucleus. Many Archae live in harsh environments, such as thermal
vents in the Ocean and hot springs. Most methane-producing bacteria are
actually Archae.
15 - Teleo-nomic means regulatory principle (nomic) guided by an objective
or intention (teleo), without implying any vitalistic connotations. For
the concept of teleonomy, see: Ayala, F., "Teleological Explanations
in Evolutionary Biology" in Philosophy of Science, (1970), v. 37,
pp. 1-15; Lorenz, Konrad. Foundations of Ethology (New York: Springer,
1981), pp. 23-35; Lorenz, K. Behind the Mirror (New York: London: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 21-25. Maturana and Varela advocate the "elimination
of teleonomy as a defining feature of living systems", because they
believe this concept does not accomplish much more than revealing "the
consistency of living systems within the domain of observation".
See : Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.G. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The
Realization of the Living. (Dordrecht, Holland: Boston: London : Reidel,
1980), pp. 85-87.
16 - On the question of the welfare of transgenic animals, see: L.F.M.
van Zutphen, M. van der Meer, (Eds.) Welfare Aspects of Transgenic Animals
(New York: Springer, 1997).
17 - By this I mean that the process was expected to be (and in fact was)
as common as any other rabbit pregnancy and birth. This is due to the
fact that transgenic technology has been successfully and regularly employed
in the creation of mice since 1980 and in rabbits since 1985. See: Gordon,
J.W., Scargos, G.A., Plotkin, D.J., Barbosa, J.A. and Ruddle, F.R. (1980)
Genetic transformation of mouse embryos by microinjection of purified
DNA. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 77, 7380-7384; Gordon, J.W. and Ruddle,
F.H. (1981). Integration and stable germ line transformation of genes
injected into mouse pronuclei. Science 214:1244-1246; Hammer, R. E., Pursel,
V. G., Rexroad, C. E., Jr., Wall, R. J., Bolt, D. J., Ebert, K. M., Palmiter,
R. D., and Brinster, R. L. Production of transgenic rabbits, sheep and
pigs by microinjection. Nature 315, 680-683 (1985). The term transgenic
was first used by J.W. Gordon and F.H. Ruddle in their 1981 paper. For
additional information on expression of GFP in rabbits, see: Kang, T Y
; Yin, X J ; Rho, G J ; Lee, H ; Lee, H J . Cloning of transgenic rabbit
embryos expressing green fluorescent protein (GFP) gene by nuclear transplantation.
Theriogenology. 53, no. 1, (2000): 222.
18 - The zygote is the cell formed by the union of two gametes. A gamete
is a reproductive cell, especially a mature sperm or egg capable of fusing
with a gamete of the opposite sex to produce the fertilized egg. Direct
microinjection of DNA into the male pronucleus of a rabbit zygote has
been the method most extensively used in the production of transgenic
rabbits. As the foreign DNA integrates into the rabbit chromosomal DNA
at the one-cell stage, the transgenic animal has the new DNA in every
cell. For detailed discussion of the methods and applications of microinjection
technology, see: Lacal, J.C., Perona, R. , and Feramisco, J. Microinjection
(New York: Springer, 1999). The first successful creation of transgenic
mice using pronuclear microinjection was reported in 1980: Gordon, J.W.
et al., 1980. Genetic transformation of mouse embryos by microinjection
of purified DNA. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 77: 7380-7384. The new gene
was proven to have been integrated into the mouse genome, but it did not
express. The first visible phenotypic change in transgenic mice was described
in 1982 for animals expressing the rat growth hormone sequence: Palmiter,
R.D. et al., 1982. Dramatic growth of mice that develop from eggs microinjected
with metallothionein-growth hormone fusion genes. Nature 300: 611-615.
Following transgenic mice creation, rabbits, sheep and pigs were also
created (see note 17). Currently, several hundred transgenic expression
papers are published each year.
19 - See note 2.
20 - A lagomorph is one of the various gnawing mammals in the order Lagomorpha,
including rabbits, hares, and pikas.
21 - Krempels, Dana M., "What Do Rabbits See?" House Rabbit
Society: Orange County Chapter Newsletter 5 (Summer 1996), 1. For a more
comprehensive examination of vision in rabbits and other animals, see:
Smythe, R.H., Vision in the Animal World, St. Martin's Press, New York
(1975).
22 - In Part I of Book IX of his "The History of Animals", written
ca. 350 BC, Aristotle recognized the complexity of animal emotional states:
"Of the animals that are comparatively obscure and short-lived the
characters or dispositions are not so obvious to recognition as are those
of animals that are longer-lived. These latter animals appear to have
a natural capacity corresponding to each of the passions: to cunning or
simplicity, courage or timidity, to good temper or to bad, and to other
similar dispositions of mind." See: Aristotle. History of Animals.
Books VII-X. (Cambridge, MA: London : Harvard University Press, 1991).
Although in the first chapter of the Metaphysics Aristotle attributes
forms of reason and intelligence to animals, in another book (Politics)
he claims that humans are the only animal capable of logos (Book VII,
Part XIII): "Animals lead for the most part a life of nature, although
in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man has rational
principle, in addition, and man only." Also in the Politics, he compares
animals to slaves (Book I, Part V): "the use made of slaves and of
tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister
to the needs of life. " See: Aristotle. The works of Aristotle (London,
Oxford Univ., 1966).
23 - In his 1637 Discourse on the Method, Descartes insists on an absolute
separation between human and animal. For him, consciousness and language
create the boundary of being between humankind and animals. Descartes
stated that "beasts have less reason than men," and that in
fact "they have no reason at all". See: Descartes, Rene. 1637.
"Discourse on the Method," in Descartes: Selected Philosophical
Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 45. For Descartes, since
animals do not have a recognizable language they lack reason, and as a
result are in his view like automata, capable of mimicking speech but
not truly able to engage in discourse that enables and supports consciousness.
The byproduct of this view is the ascription of animality to the domain
of the unconscious. This maneuver did not escape the attention of semiotician
Charles Sander Peirce, who criticized Descartes: "Descartes was of
the opinion that animals were unconscious automata. He might as well have
thought that all men but himself were unconscious" See: Peirce, Charles
Sanders. 1901. "Minute Logic," in Peirce on Signs: Writings
on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce. Ed. James Hoopes. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 234.
24 - In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book II, Chapter XI),
John Locke wrote: "If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and
enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive
in that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having
of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man
and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no
means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of
making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason
to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general
ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs."
Even though Locke denied animals the faculty of abstract thought, he still
did not agree with Descartes in considering animals automata. Still in
the same chapter, Locke wrote: " if they [animals] have any ideas
at all, and are not bare machines, (as some would have them,) we cannot
deny them to have some reason." See: Locke, John. An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 208. In his partial rejection
of the Cartesian theory of knowledge John Locke proposed two sources of
ideas: sensation and reflection. By means of the difference between ideas
of sensation and ideas of reflection, Locke distinguished man from animals:
animals had certain sensory ideas and a degree of reason but no general
ideas (i.e., abstraction ability) and as a result no language for their
manifestation. For Locke, abstraction is firmly beyond the capacity of
any animal, and its is precisely abstract thought that plays a fundamental
role in forming the ideas of mixed modes, on which morality depends.
25 - For Gottfried Leibniz, animals did not have self-consciousness and
the power to recognize eternal truths, which for him were characteristics
of the souls of men. He wrote: "I am also inclined to believe that
there are souls in the lower animals because it pertains to the perfection
of things that when all those things are present which are adapted to
a soul, the souls also should be understood to be present." [...]
But no one should think that it can with equal justice be inferred that
there must also be minds in the lower animals; for it must be known that
the order of things will not allow all souls to be free from the vicissitudes
of matter, nor will justice permit some minds to be abandoned to agitation.
So it was sufficient that souls should be given to the lower animals,
especially as their bodies are not made for reasoning, but destined to
various functions -- the silkworm to weave, the bee to make honey, and
the others to the other functions by which the universe is distinguished."
See: Leibniz, G., "A Specimen of Discoveries About Marvellous Secrets"
(c. 1686), in Philosophical Writings (London : Melbourne: Dent, 1984),
p. 84.
26 - In The Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysical First Principles of the
Doctrine of Virtue) Kant states that we as human beings are distinguished
from other animals by our capacity to set ends for ourselves, which is
only possible for a rational being. See: The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 381, 384-85, 392. For Kant the
moral faculty of humans was directly connected to the fundamental property
of reason. He did not find in nature the origin of morality, and thus
denied animals membership in the (moral) kingdom of ends. For Kant, the
sense of moral duty is inherent in humans (but not animals): "animals
are not self conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That
end is man." He continued: "our duties towards animals are merely
indirect duties towards humanity". In other words, Kant believed
one should not harm animals because in doing so one indirectly would damage
humanity (one might see another human as less human and become prone to
other kinds of cruelty). See: Kant, I. "Duties to Animals",
in Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Eds. T. Regan & P. Singer.
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. 122.
27 - In his seminal essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1873),
Friedrich Nietzsche (who once stopped a man from beating his horse) wrote:
"As a "rational" being, [a person] now places his behavior
under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried
away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all
these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can
entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which
distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize
perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a
concept." See Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On Truth and Lies in a
Nonmoral Sense", in Philosophy and Truth, Edited by Daniel Breazeale
(New York: Humanity, 1999), p. 84. In this essay, Nietzsche states that
what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors,
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." For him arbitrariness prevails
within human experience: what one ordinarily calls "truth" is
nothing but the invention of fixed conventions for practical purposes,
particularly those of security and consistency.
28 - Buber expounds on the I-Thou relationship between human and non-human
animals: "Man once "tamed" animals, and he is still capable
of this singular achievement. He draws animals into his atmosphere and
moves them to accept him, the stranger, in an elemental way, and to respond
to him. He wins from them an often astonishing active response to his
approach, to his addressing them, and moreover a response which in general
is stronger and directer in proportion as his attitude is a genuine saying
of Thou. Animals, like children, are not seldom able to see through any
hypocritical tenderness. But even outside the sphere of taming a similar
contact between men and animals sometimes takes place--with men who have
in the depths of their being a potential partnership with animals, not
predominantly persons of "animal" nature, but rather those whose
very nature is spiritual". See: Buber, Martin. I and Thou (New York:
Collier, 1987), p. 125.
29 - For a comprehensive examination of the approaches to animality within
the Western tradition, and for a philosophical contribution towards a
more respectful understanding of non-human animals, see: Fontenay, Elisabeth.
Le silence des betes (Paris: Fayard, 1998).
30 - For the first time, gene therapy has unequivocally succeeded. French
doctors used the treatment, which involves adding working genes to cells,
to save the lives of several children who might otherwise have died of
a severe immune disorder. See: Marina Cavazzana-Calvo, Salima Hacein-Bey,
Geneviève de Saint Basile, Fabian Gross, Eric Yvon, Patrick Nusbaum,
Françoise Selz, Christophe Hue, Stéphanie Certain, Jean-Laurent
Casanova, Philippe Bousso, Françoise Le Deist, and Alain Fischer.
"Gene Therapy of Human Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1
Disease", Science 2000 April 28; 288: 669-672. For a popular account,
see: Petitnicolas, Catherine. "Premier succès de la thérapie
génique", Le Figaro, April 28, 2000, p. 16.
31 - A case in point is the notorious example of Monsanto's claim that
it seeks to feed the world, and the rebuke from 24 African delegates to
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) negotiations on the International
Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources, June 1998. See: Bruno, Kenny.
"Monsanto's Failing PR Strategy", in The Ecologist, Vol. 28,
N. 5, Sept/Oct 1998, p. 291.
32 - Here I use the word "symbolic" in the sense that the artwork
is not just an entity to be regarded for its intrinsic and unique properties
or just a pragmatic way of accomplishing a goal, but also (and always)
a means of producing a world of understanding. My use of the word is partially
motivated by Erwin Panofky's application of Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy
of Symbolic Forms (3 vol., 1923-29). See: Panofsky, E. Perspective as
Symbolic Form (New York: Zone Books, 1991). On pages 40-41 Panofky says
that perspective is "one of those 'symbolic forms' in which 'spiritual
meaning' is attached to a concrete, material sign and intrinsically given
to this sign."
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